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Abstract 
In the article we show an attack on the cryptographic protocol of electronic auction with 
extended requirements [1]. The found attack consists of authentication breach and secret retrieval. 
It is a kind of “man in the middle attack”. The intruder impersonates an agent and learns some 
secret information. We have discovered this flaw using OFMC an automatic tool of cryptographic 
protocol verification. After a description of this attack, we propose a new version of the e-auction 
protocol. We also check with OFMC the secrecy for the new protocol and give an informal proof 
of the other properties that this new e-auction protocol has to guarantee. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, we are witnesses and participants of ubiquitous changes in 
everyday activities. These changes are connected with the development of 
technological world. Among the researchers information communications are the 
most widespread. The high stress is put on the development of well-available, 
mobile information services called ”e-anything”, like e-government, e-money, e-
banking and e-auction. These mentioned processes are fulfilled mainly in an 
electronic way, thanks to which one can increase their availability, cutting down 
the costs according to the traditional way of these services. There are many 
electronic services in the e-commerce one of them are electronic auctions. For 
instance, the auction websites, such as eBay, are popular the number of and their 
users is still growing. 
e-auction: The auction schemes can be divided into four groups: 
– The English auction [2], for instance eBay, is the most widespread. In this 
auction the users bid the price for a given object. The prices grow till the 
end of the auction. Hence the winner is the bidder who proposed the 
highest price. 
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– 1st Price Sealed-Bid [1,3], in this case the users independently define the 
price for given goods. The price defined by the bidder can not be increased 
and has only one value. The user who will declare the highest price wins 
goods and he has to pay the announced price. 
– The Vickrey auction [4], alternatively called 2nd Price Sealed-Bid, is very 
similar to the previous scheme. The difference is that the auction is won by 
the person, who declared the highest sum the given goods but he pays the 
second highest price proposed. 
– The Dutch auction [5] starts with the highest possible price and the bidders 
decrease the price until one bidder decides to pay the current value. The 
winning bidder pays the price on which the auction is stopped.  
Attack and Verification: After creating the cryptographic protocol the post-
designing analysis should be done. It is important because there are no 
guarantees that a protocol is secure. In literature a taxonomy of cryptographic 
protocol attacks is proposed. The taxonomies can be based on the informal 
methods or formal verification. Informal taxonomies are based on the protocol 
flaws [6] or on replay attacks in terms of message origin and destination [7] or 
on an intruder’s attack objectives and different roles of the parts of protocol [8]. 
For instance in [8] the authors grouped the attacks into seven categories: 
– Authentication Breach: The intruder finishes a protocol run in order to 
impersonate a legitimate principal. 
– Authentication Breach + Secret Retrieval: The intruder finishes a protocol 
run in order to impersonate a legitimated agent which accepts the secret 
and to retrieve the secret. 
– Authentication Breach + Secret Revival: The intruder finishes a protocol 
run in order to impersonate a legitimate principal and to receive an old 
secret. The intruder must impersonate the agent which generates the secret. 
– Authentication Breach + Secret Injection: The intruder finishes a protocol 
run in order to impersonate a legitimate principal and to inject a secret of 
his own. The intruder must impersonate the agent which generates the 
secret. 
– Message Generation: The intruder makes a protocol run until some stage 
such that he obtains a new valid fake message. 
– Secret Retrieval: The intruder retrieves the secret distributed between two 
legitimate principals. 
– Session Hijacking: The intruder takes over a protocol run after two 
legitimate principals successfully authenticates each other and before the 
secret is received by the participant which accepts the secret. 
The usage and the popularity of the electronic auction is connected with the 
fulfillment of a proper level of security of information sent between different 
parties using cryptographic protocols [9]. For instance, the e-auction protocols 
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have to guarantee confidentiality, privacy, integrity, non-repudiation of agents 
and anonymity of bidders. These security requirements are solved by the 
conception of the protocols using some cryptographic primitives. Achieving 
these properties correctly is not obvious and an automatic verification is useful 
to avoid some flaws. There are many tools to check formally and automatically 
the cryptographic protocols [10-17]. 
In the remaining part of the paper, we present an attack on the electronic 
auction protocol with extended requirement [1], found by the tool OFMC [17] 
one of the tools of AVISPA [16]. This flaw is based on an authentication breach 
and a secret retrieval. We also revise the mentioned protocol of e-auction by 
improving its security properties. 
Plan of the paper: In the following section, we give the properties satisfied by 
an e-auction protocols and the notations used in the paper. In Section 3 we recall 
the e-auction protocol [1]. In Section 4, we present the attack on this protocol. 
Then we give a new version of this protocol in Section 5. Before to concluding 
in the last section, we explain different security properties satisfied by our new 
version of the protocol. 
 
2. Properties of e-auction and notations 
The e-auction protocols aim at guarantee of the following features: 
– Secrecy of bids: Nobody, except the bidder himself and the auctioneer, can 
establish the contents of the sent offers. 
– Integrity of data: The sent offers and the final results of e-auction cannot 
be modified. 
– Non-repudiation: Bidders cannot deny the contents of the offer and the fact 
that he made it. 
– Authentication of participants: Only registered persons can announce  
e-auction and make auction offers. 
– Anonymity of bidders: The true identity of bidder who won the auction and 
also the identity of all the bidders are not public. 
– Public verification: Everyone can check, which offer won e-auction. 
Participants of e-auction can check if their offers were taken into 
consideration. 
In the remaining part of the paper, we use the following notations to describe 
the entities which will take part of the e-auction protocol: 
– A: registered principal who wants to sell the object (Auctioneer). 
– B: registered principal who wants to win the object (Bidder). 
– C: principal who wants to register. 
– TTP: trustworthy third part. 
– WWW: place for public information. 
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Notice that C is a generic name representing either an auctioneer A or a 
bidder B. We also use for the messages the following notations: 
– PKC: public key of the agent C. 
– SKC: private key of the agent C. 
– NA: nonce associated to the agent A. 
– 
AN
T : time stamp associated to the nonce NA. 
– NRA: registration number associated to the agent A. 
 
3. Description of the old electronic auction protocol 
We now describe the 1st Price Sealed-Bid protocol proposed in [1]. The 
cryptographic protocol with extended requirements consists of four 
subprotocols: certification, notification of auction, notification of offer and the 
choice of offer. The first step is the registration of participants taking part in the 
e-auction using TTP. The subprotocol of certification is used by all the 
participants: the bidders B and the auctioneer A. The next step is the auction 
notification by registered principal A. In the subprotocol of notification of 
auction, the TTP publishes the notified by A auction properties. In the next 
subprotocol for offer notification, each registered person can take part in auction 
by sending his offer to TTP. The last subprotocol is executed once the e-auction 
is closed i.e. after elapsing of time for notification of offers. Then the auctioneer 
A and the bidders, send to TTP their parts of secret needed to read offers. After 
decoding them, the TTP sends it to the auctioneer A, who chooses the vinning 
offer and sends back information about the vinning offer to TTP. Finally, the 
TTP publishes the winning auction number using WWW. In the following we 
describe more precisely each step of the protocol. 
 
3.1. The certification subprotocol 
The participation in e-auction has to be preceded by obtaining suitable 
authorizations, and is described in Figure 1. 
 




C TTP Do  
2. ^ `  ^ ` : , , ,CTTP TTP
C
C NR C CSK SK PK
C TTP NR T SK PK­ ½m ® ¾¯ ¿  
Fig. 1. Certification subprotocol 
 
This subprotocol works as follows. A person who applies for certificate, 
denoted by C, is either an auctioneer or a bidder. He should possess appropriate 
documents DC as well as private key SKC achieved from one of indicated earlier 
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centers of authorization. After that the documents mentioned above are digitally 
signed by using SKC and encrypted by the public key PKTTP. Then C sends them 
to TTP. Hence the TTP decrypts documents and then verifies them. After 
positive verification, the TTP generates unique registration number for a given 
person NRC. Registration number is valid during definite time, given by the time 
stamp of registration number TNRC. The TTP generates also the private key SKC 
and the public key PKC, which will be used in the next subprotocol. Validity of 
these keys ends along with crossing the time given by TNRC. The TTP digitally 
signs the generated data, encrypts them by the public key PKC  and then sends 
them to C. 
 
3.2. The auction notification subprotocol 
This subprotocol is designed for the agent Dwhich wants to announce the 
electronic auction. In the protocol only registered principals can take part in the 
rest of the e-auction protocol. That requirement will be fulfilled when the agent 
finishes with success the previous subprotocol of certification. 
 
^ `^ `
 ^ `^ `
1.  : , , ,
2.  :
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Fig. 2. Auction notification subprotocol 
 
This subprotocol works as follows and is described in Figure 2. In the first 
step, A sends to TTP, digitally signed by SKA and encrypted by PKTTP the 
following information: the registration number NRA, the time stamp TNRA, the 
conditions of auction APA and his individual number NA. The main auction 
agency TTP verifies the registration number of A, NRA and the validity of his 
time stamp. After positive authorization TTP generates the individual number of 
auction NbAu and the pair of keys for concrete auction (SKAu, PKAu). The private 
key of auction SKAu is divided by the use of the threshold scheme of dividing 
secret [19]. Secret is divided into three parts, designed for A: SKP(A), for 
TTP: SKP(TTP) and for bidders in auction: SKP(B). Each part is necessary to 
reconstruct the full private key SKAu. The TTP sends digitally signed by SKTTP 
and encrypted by PKA – the part of secret designed for A, SKP(A). Hence, the TTP 
publishes the number of auction NbAu, auction properties APA and the public key 
of the concrete auction. 
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3.3. The auction offer subprotocol 
After the auction is notified and published, the interested parties can notify 
their offers. A bidder who wants take part in the auction should gets earlier the 
registration number NRB, the private key SKB and his offer OFB. Then the bidder 
B, generates his individual number NbB and marks his offer by time stamp 
KTOFB. 
 
^ `^ ` ^ `^ `
^ `^ `





B B B Au OFSK SKPK PK
SK PK





Fig. 3. Auction offer subprotocol 
 
This subprotocol works as follows and is described in Figure 3. Firstly, 
bidders send to TTP digitally signed by SKB and encrypted by PKTTP the 
following information: NbB, NbAu, NRB, TOFB. The offer OFB is also digitally 
signed by SKB and encrypted by the public key of a given auction PKAu. Then 
these messages are sent to TTP. If sent data are correct, then the TTP sends the 
confirmation of the offer notification. Finally, the Confirmation is digitally 
signed by SKTTP and encrypted by the public key PKB of a given bidder. 
 
3.4. The offer choice subprotocol 
















































A TTP NR NR N N Nb
TTP WWW NR N
­ ½o ® ¾¯ ¿
­ ½o ® ¾¯ ¿
­ ½m ® ¾¯ ¿




Fig. 4. Offer choice subprotocol 
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This subprotocol, described in Figure 4, works as follows. Knowing the 
number N of bidders who sent their offers, the TTP divides earlier split parts of 
main secret of auction into N smaller parts SKP(Bi). He uses again the safe 
threshold scheme dividing the secret into N part which the following profile 
(2,N), i.e. two persons are sufficient to reconstruct the secret divided into N 
parts. Created parts SK(Bi) are digitally signed by SKTTP, encrypted by SKBi and 
sent to the appropriate bidder Bi. In the next step, the auctioneer A and the 
bidders Bi send digitally signed and encrypted, their parts of secret to TTP. After 
that TTP joins the received parts of the secret into the main secret of the auction 
SKAu. Having the whole secret of given auction the TTP can decrypt all sent 
offers OFBi in the previous protocol. After the TTP sends to the auctioneer A, 
which announced the auction, all offers OFBi digitally signed by the bidders. All 
offers are earlier decrypted by SKTTP and encrypted with PKA. After that the 
auctioneer A has received the offers, he chooses the best offer and sends the 
result to TTP in order to notify the winner. The results include the following 
information: the registration number NRB(win) of the bidder who has won the 
auction, the auctioneer registration number NRA, the individual numbers NBi of 
the bidders who sent the offer, the auctioneer individual number NA and the 
number of auction NbAu. These exchanged information is digitally signed by SKA 
and encrypted by PKTTP. When that the TTP has received this information, he 
publishes the individual number of the bidder who won the auction SKNRB(win) 
and the numbers of bidders NBi. 
 
4. The attack 
In this section, we describe the flaw found on the first phase which is a kind 
of “man in the middle” attack. It is based on the fact that the messages sent by 
the agent C and the TTP in the first phase are not authenticated and on the fact 
that the answer given by the server does not contain any information about the 
identity of the agent C. 
Notation: The intruder is denoted by I, and I(C) means that the intruder is 
impersonating the agent C. 
 
  ^ `^ `
  ^ `^ `
  ^ ` ^ `^ `
  ^ ` ^ `^ `
1.1  :
2.1 :
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Fig. 5. Description of the attack on the first phase in Figure 1 
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Description of the attack: This attack requires two sessions of the first phase 
of the protocol and is described in Figure 5. The agent C starts the step 1.1 of a 
session of this protocol and sends the message {{D(C)}SKC}PKTTP on the network. 
The intruder controls the network, in consequence he blocks the first message 
sent by C. In parallel the attacker plays the first step of a second session 2.1 with 
the server TTP. The intruder generates a new document DI and sends it to the 
TTP instead of the message generated by C in the first step of the first session. 
The server TTP generates automaticaly a registration number, a timestamp, a set 
of keys encrypted with his private and sends all this information ecncrypted with 
the public key of the intruder in step 2.2. The intruder uncrypts this message 
with his private key and learns the new sets of keys generated by the server. He 
is now able to forge the message 1.2 of the first session to convince the agent C 
that everything is normal. 
This attack on the secrecy of the new keys was find by our modeling of this 
first phase of the old protocol in the OFMC tool. This attack implies that the 
intruder falsifies the document produced by the agent C and the most important 
that the intruder can understand all the encrypted information exchanged 
between the server and the agent C, during the next steps of the protocol. 
 
5. The solution 
In this section, we correct the first phase of the previous protocol and we also 
give a new version of the other phases of the protocol.We have checked all these 
phases of this new version for the secrecy property with OFMC. 
Notice that the new protocol also optimizes the old protocol because we 
decrease the complexity of different subprotocols. First of all, the changes are 
connected with the fulfillment of confidentiality of bids. In the old protocol it 
was gained by dividing the secret key of the given auction SKP into the three 
parts. As a result, the offer could be decrypted only then if the parts of the secret 
key are joined together. In the proposed revision of the protocol the message 
containing the offer are encrypted by the public key PKTTP and after that the 
offer OFB is encrypted by the public key of the auctioneer PKA. Due to the use 
the public key of TTP nobody who will intercept the message can decrypt it. 
Moreover, the TTP can not learn the offer because it is encrypted by the key of 
the auctioneer. Secondly, we decrease the computation operation in the new 
version of protocol because we do not use the needless digital signatures. 
 
5.1. First phase 
In Figure 6 the new description of the first phase is given. The client sends his 
identity and a fresh nonce NC encrypted by the public key PKTTP. The TTP 
answers sending the following message: the nonce of the client NC, a new and 




Attack and revison of an electronic auction protocol using OFMC 179 
fresh register number NRC, a timestamps TNRC to control the validity of the 
registration and his identity. That message is encrypted by the public key of the 
client. Finally the client confirms his registration by sending back to the server 












C C NR PK
C C PK
C TTP C N
C TTP N NR T TTP





Fig. 6. New certification subprotocol 
 
After this first phase the client has a new registration number NRC and a time 
stamp TNRC according to the document DC he sends. The third exchange is 
necessary to correct the previous version of the protocol. It assures the server 
that the client received the registration number and in consequence, denies that 
he is talking with somebody who wants to impersonate the client. Notice that the 
identity of TTP in second message is crucial to avoid a kind of man in the 
middle attack. 
 
5.2. Second phase 
This phase of the protocol is composed of 2 parts, described in Figures 7  
and 8: 
1. The auctioneer proposes his offer and the server publishes it, Figure 7. 
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Fig. 7. New subprotocol for the e-auction notification by the vendor 
 
Auctioneer stage: In this phase the auctioneer A submits his auction to the 
server. In the first message the sends his registration number NRA obtained in the 
previous phase, the proposal of the auction APA, his identity and a new nonce 
NAPA. The message is encrypted by the key of TTP. The server checks the 
validity of the received registration number and if it is positive the TTP 
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generates a fresh auction number NbAu. After that he sends the auction number 
NbAu, the nonce NAPA and his name. The auctioneer confirms the reception of the 
message by sending the server a new number of auction and a time stamp TNbAu. 
Then the server publishes on a web site, the open time for a given auction 
TAu(open) and the close time TAu(close) for that auction. During that time the received 
auction properties will be taken into account. Except for this information, TTP 
publishes the description of the auction APA and the public key PKA of the 
auctioneer. 
 
^ `  ^ `
^ `
^ `
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Fig. 8. New subprotocol for the notification of the offers 
 
Bidders stage: The next phase, described in Figure 8 based on the collection 
of all the propositions done by bidders during the time interval allowed for the 
auction. 
The bidder B makes an offer OFB and generates a new nonce NOFB. He 
encrypts with the public key of the server and sends to TTP: his registration NRB, 
obtained during the first phase, the auction number NbAu, his name, the new 
nonce NOFB, his offer encrypted by the public key of the vendor (avoiding that 
the server read it), and the hash of his offer (giving the possibility to the server to 
find the bidder in the last phase). The server answers giving a new registration 
number NbOFB, the nonce received NOFB and his identity. The bidder confirms to 
the server by sending a time stamp TNbOFB and the number NbOFB. 
 
5.3. Last phase 
Once the auction is closed, the auctioneer chooses the winner and the server 
publishes his identity during the subprotocol described in Figure 9. First the 
auctioneer sends to the TTP: the registration number of the auction NbAu, all the 
offers OFBi encrypted by the bidders with the public key PKA of the auctioneer, 
his identity and a new nonce NTTP. The auctioneer makes the choice and 
communicates it to the TTP by sending the hash of the winner offer, the auction 
number, the nonce and his identity. Finally, using the hash of the offers obtained 
in the previous phase, the TTP finds and publishes the number of the winner 
NOFB(win), all bidder’s individual numbers NOFB(i) and the number of the auction 
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NbAu. This step assures that all the propositions made by all the bidders were 
transmitted to the auctioneer and taken into account. Hence everybody can check 
anonymously who is the winner of the e-auction. 
^ `^ `
  ^ `
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Fig. 9. New offer choice subprotocol 
 
5.4. Security analysis 
We identify properties that this protocol has to verify and give some 
explications how the new e-auction protocol satisfies them. 
Secrecy: The integrity and confidentiality of transaction must be protected. 
Except for the information published on the TTP website WWW, all message 
transactions are protected by the public encryption system to ensure the integrity 
and confidentiality of messages. Moreover, we check the secrecy of all data 
using the formal verification OFMC tool. Moreover by construction of the 
protocol the OFMC does not have access to the bids because they are directly 
encrypted by the public key of the auctioneer. 
Authentication: Only registered persons can make or announce an e-auction. 
The certification subprotocol is responsible for main verification of the auction 
participants. In other subprotocols the TTP as the third trustworthy part checks 
the required documents and verifies that the participants in auction have a valid 
registration number. This registration number is a fresh number generated by 
TTP during the first phase. 
Non repudiation: The winner and the bidders cannot deny the contents of 
their offers. The auction and the bids are firstly transmitted to the trustworthy 
third part. The TTP stores the received data and information about the identity of 
the auctioneer or bidder. In this way the TTP can prove that he received some 
information from an agent, exhibiting for instance the hash of the auction done 
or the proposition submitted by the participant. 
Anonymity: The auctioneer can not know the true identity of the bidder. The 
name of the winning bidder is not public because only the numbers associated to 
the agents are published. When the bidding time expires, the auctioneer receives 
the offers sent. Those offers do not include bidders’ identity and are stored only 
by the TTP. They are encrypted by the public key PKA which denies that TTP 
knows the content of the auctions made by the bidders. When the auctioneer 
chooses the winning offer only the bidder’s individual number is published. This 
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number shows the winning bidder identity and assures the anonymity of the true 
winner and the bidders. 
Public verification: Everybody can check if an offer has to be taken into 
account in the e-auction. When the e-auction is finished, all bidder’s individual 
numbers taking part in the auction are published. Every participant can check if 
his number is on the list which is equivalent with the fact that the offer was 
taken into consideration by the auctioneer. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The security of electronic auction is a crucial issue on electronic market. 
Security requirements are defined by security properties such as secrecy, 
authentication, anonymity. These features are guaranteed by protocols including 
cryptographic primitives and other security mechanisms. Designing 
cryptographic protocol is a complex process and assures that the security 
properties verification of the protocol is not an easy task. In the article we have 
presented the authentication breach and secret retrieval attack on the 
cryptographic protocol with extended requirements [1]. The attack was 
discovered by the formal verification tool OFMC. We also propose the revision 
of e-auction protocol which corrects founded attack and optimizes the 
complexity of old protocol. We have also checked with OFMC the secrecy of 
the data exchanged for the new protocol. The next step will be to develop some 
formal methods for verifying automatically all other properties that an e-auction 
protocol has to assure. 
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